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ADMIRALTY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:
"MARITIME BUT LOCAL" DOCTRINE REJECTED AS
LIMITATION ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE
LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT
SECTION 3 (a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act explicitly states that benefits may be paid only if an
injury (1) occurs on navigable waters, and (2) "may not validly be"
compensable under a state workmen's compensation statute.' In the
recent case of Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.,2 the Supreme Court
apparently jettisoned the second limitation in holding that the Long-
shoremen's Act provides "compensation for all injuries sustained
by employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury
might also [be] ... within the constitutional reach of a state work-
men's compensation law."3
In Calbeck, two employees, both welders, were injured while
working on uncompleted vessels which had been launched into
navigable rivers. In both cases, awards by Deputy Commissioners
under the Longshoremen's Act were sustained by federal district
courts; but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on the
ground that since injuries sustained on launched but uncompleted
vessels are clearly compensable under state acts, the second limita-
tion of section 3 (a) removed jurisdiction from the Deputy Com-
missioners to hear the claims.4 The Supreme Court in a six to two
decision reversed and sustained the awards.
The federal-state conflict over workmen's compensation for in-
jured harbor workers stems from the 1917 case of Southern Pac. Co.
v. Jensen5 in which the Supreme Court declared that state com-
pensation statutes could not constitutionally apply to maritime
144 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a) (1958).
2370 U.S. 114 (1962).
8 1d. at 117.
'Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Donovan, 293 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1961); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961). Since both cases involved the same ques-
tions of fact and law, they were consolidated in the petition for certiorari. See
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 368 U.S. 946 (1961).
- 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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workers injured on navigable waters since this would materially
prejudice the uniformity of the general maritime law.0 Subse-
quently, in order to mitigate the harshness of leaving thousands of
harbor workers without a compensation remedy on the mere fortuity
of their being injured on navigable waters instead of on land or a
dock, the Court fostered the development of the "maritime but
local" doctrine.7 This concept allowed recovery under state acts
for some injuries received on navigable waters on the ground that,
althouigh occurring within the admiralty jurisdiction, state com-
pensation would not disrupt maritime uniformity since the em-
ployee's activity at the time of injury had no direct relation to
navigation or commerce.
In the meantime, Congress twice enacted statutes designed to
allow state acts to apply to all injuries on navigable waters. Both
were struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional delega-
tions of legislative power which would make the maritime law
subject to discordant state laws.8 Finally, in 1927 Congress passed
the Longshoremen's Act9 whose purpose was to provide a federal
0 U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 2 extends the judicial power of the United States to "all
cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." The Court also interpreted U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8 cl. 18, as giving Congress paramount power to determine the substantive
maritime law. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra note 5 at 214-16. See generally, D.
Currie, Federalism And The Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess;' 1960 Sup. CT. REv.
158; Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and the Maritime Law, 38 YALE L.J. 472
(1929); Wright, Uniformity in the Maritime Law of the United States (pts. 1, 2), 73 U.
PA. L. REV. 123, 223 (1925).
The Jensen doctrine does not extend to land or extensions of land, such as docks.
State Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
7See, e.g., Millers' Indem. Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926); Ex parte
Rosengrant, 213 Ala. 202, 104 So. 409 (1925), aff'd per curiam, 273 U.S. 664 (1926);
Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). The classic statement of
the "maritime but local" doctrine is found in Sultan Ry. & Timber Co. v. Department
of Labor, 277 U.S. 135 (1928). See generally, 2 LARSON, WoRmEtaN's COMPENSATION
§ 89.22 (1961) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
However, even with the "maritime but local" exception to the Jensen doctrine, the
vast majority of harbor workers, in particular longshoremen and repairmen, could not
recover under the state statutes if injured on navigable waters. Their only remedy
was an admiralty tort action. See, e.g., Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Cook, 281
U.S. 233 (1930) (longshoremen); John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930)
(repairmen).
8Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, § 1, 40 Stat. 395, held unconstitutional in Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, § 1, 42 Stat. 634,
held unconstitutional in State of Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219
Q924). Both acts amended the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowing state compensation
statutes to apply concurrently with admiralty tort actions for injuries on navigable
waters. The second amendment differed from the first only in excluding seamen.
944 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901-50 (1958) (constitutionality
upheld in Crowell v. Bensen, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)).
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compensation remedy for all employees under its coverage.
The second limitation of section 3 (a) was from the outset inter-
preted to exclude "maritime but local" cases from the jurisdiction
of the Longshoremen's Act.10 Since courts failed to delineate with
any consistency the limits of state jurisdiction under this doctrine,
however, litigation proved necessary in many borderline cases to
determine whether the state or federal government had jurisdiction
over the injury. Moreover,, unless the injured employee simul-
taneously filed claims under both the Longshoremen's Act and the
applicable state act, he took the risk of having his claim barred by
a statute of limitations if his first choice proved wrong."X To allevi-
ate this awkwardness in obtaining compensation relief, the Supreme
Court in 1942 formulated the "twilight zone" doctrine. 12 The effect
of this doctrine was to allow a claimant his choice between the
federal or the applicable state act when the factual situation pre-
sented reasonable doubt as to the proper jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court did not, however, apply the "twilight zone"
concept to the instant case, but rather based its decision on the
entirely new ground that the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act
extends to all injuries received on navigable waters, despite the
possible concurrent application of a state workmen's compensation
act.'3 Thus, the Court rejected the prior interpretation that the
second limitation of section 3 (a) precluded federal jurisdiction over
10 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Pillsbury, 63 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1933); Dewey Fish Co.
v. Department of Labor, 181 Wash. 95, 41 P.2d 1099 (1935). See GILMORE & BLACK,
ADMIRALTY § 6-49 (1957); 2 LARSON § 89.22 n. 71, § 89.23 (b); Comment, 57 YAM L.J.
243, 267 (1947).
11 See, e.g., Dawson v. Jahncke Drydock, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. La. 1940); Ayers
v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1936).
12 See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942) (employee drowned when
he fell off barge while helping to dismantle an abandoned drawbridge). See generally,
Baer, At Sea With The United States Supreme Court, 38 N.C.L. REv. 307, 344-51
(1960); Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the
Twilight Zone, 68 HARe. L. Rav. 637 (1955); Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 1205-23 (1958);
Note, 53 YALE L.J. 348 (1944).
13 370 U.S. at 117, 126-27. But cf. Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair
Yard, Inc., 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1962), which was decided a few weeks after Calbeck.
There a laborer cleaning a barge on a marine railroad was injured while attempting to
move a heavy hose lying partially under the barge. At the time of his injury, he
was standing on the ground adjacent to the marine railroad. Interpreting Calbeck
as a "twilight zone" case, the Fifth Circuit upheld an award under the Longshoremen's
Act on the ground that this case also fell within the "twilight zone." While the
result in Holland may be justifiable on the basis that the injury occurred within the
area of federal coverage, the Court in Calbeck dearly seemed to dispose of the
"twilight zone" concept in the determination of federal jurisdiction.
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"maritime but local" cases 4 and upheld the federal awards even
though the claimants clearly could have obtained state compensation
under the "maritime but local" doctrine.' 5 Relying heavily on legis-
lative history, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended
the Longshoremen's Act to provide a reliable remedy for all harbor
workers injured on navigable waters and this objective would be
impossible unless the Act applied to the "maritime but local" cases.
Several factors were utilized by the Court to support its conclusion.
Time-consuming litigation to determine the necessarily vague con-
tours of the "maritime but local" doctrine will be eliminated.
Secondly, the possible failure of a state to enact a compensation
statute to cover injuries under the "maritime but local" doctrine
will not prevent a harbor worker injured on navigable waters from
having any compensation remedy. 6 Finally, the Court pointed out
that the Longshoremen's Act was designed to eliminate the admin-
istrative burden caused by the constant litigation of the constitu-
tional issue of maritime uniformity required by Jensen whenever
the application of the "maritime but local" concept was at issue.
The legislative history of the Longshoremen's Act, however, does
not appear to support the Court's conclusion.' 7 The statutory
language of the second limitation of section 3 (a) is unambiguous,
and it seems clear that Congress, as in its two earlier unsuccessful
attempts, intended to give the states as much jurisdiction as possible,
leaving the federal act to cover only those situations where the
1, See cases cited notes 7 and 10 supra.
15 State compensation has been consistently allowed where an injury has occurred
on launched but uncompleted vessels. E.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, .51 S.W.2d
374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639 (1938); Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469
(1922).
l This argument seems moot now, however, as all states have compensation
statutes and the federal courts never had much difficulty in overcoming the theoretical
vacuum posed by the Court. Compare United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639 (1933) (no federal award even though state had
no compensation statute) with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Branham, 136 F.2d 873 (4th Cir.
1943) (same court indicated it no longer followed the Taylor case). But see Rodes,
supra note 12 at 646-47.
17 The meaning of the second limitation of § 3 (a) in its various forms received only
minor attention in the extensive hearings and floor debates on the Longshoremen's
Act. See Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. 56-57, 92, 95-96 (1926); Hearings Before the House Judiciary Committee on H.R.
9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1926). The original wording of the second limitation of
§ 3 (a) was that the act would not apply to "employment of local concern and of no
direct relation to navigation and commerce...." Senate Hearings, supra at 1.
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Supreme Court had previously denied state competence.' 8 It is
submitted, however, that although the Court's interpretation of the
statutory language is questionable, the extension of the Longshore-
men's Act's jurisdiction in Calbeck was forecast by past decisions
and can be supported by important practical and theoretical con-
siderations.
Previous cases have indicated that "maritime but local" in-
juries might qualify for benefits under the Longshoremen's Act.19
Furthermore, by formulation of the "twilight zone" concept twenty
years prior to the Calbeck case, the Court clearly had implied a
rejection of the prior interpretation that the second limitation of
section 3 (a) demanded mutually exclusive jurisdiction between the
federal and state acts in "maritime but local" cases.20
18 See, e.g., Hearings Before the House Committee on H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. 39-45 (1926); S. REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1926). See also text accom-
panying note 8 supra.
11 See Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 US. 334 (1953), in which the Court
extended the coverage of the act to include injured employees working on non-
maritime, as well as maritime, activities on navigable waters so long as the employer
had any employees engaged in maritime employment. Yet the determination that the
employee was engaged in a non-maritime activity on navigable waters was the condi-
tion precedent to state recovery under the "maritime but local" doctrine both before
and after the passage of the Longshoremen's Act. See cases cited in notes 7 and 10
supra. Since almost every waterfront employer has some employees engaged in
maritime employment, the O'Rourke case in effect brought the great majority of the
"maritime but local" cases within the coverage of the Federal act. See Dixie Sand &
Gravel Corp. v. Holland, 255 F.2d 304 (1958), aff'd on rehearing, 269 F.2d 495 (6th
Cir. 1959). But see Warner v. Traelers Ins. Co., 332 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960); Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Marshall, 308 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957); Baer, supra note 15, at 347-50. See also the leading case of Parker v.
Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 US. 244 (1941), discussed in 2 LARSON § 89.23 (b).
20 See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 260 (1942) (dissent). While
the second limitation of § 3 (a) excludes from the coverage of the act those cases
where a state remedy may "validly be provided by state law," § 5 of the act states
that liability "shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to
his employee . . . at law or in admiralty...." 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905
(1958). If § 5 is interpreted literally, it would seem to preclude the possibility of the
employer's liability under both the Longshoremen's Act and the applicable state act
for the same injury, seemingly allowed in a "twilight zone" case. Section 5 is, however,
similar to the mutually exclusive provisions of state compensation acts, and since
Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947), a supplementary award in a
second state has been allowed on the rationale that these provisions are exclusive of
common law liability, but not of supplementary compensation benefits in a second
forum. Double recovery is prevented by deducting the amount of the original award
from the second. See generally, 2 LASON §§ 85.00-86.50; Wellon, Workmen's Com-
pensation, Conflict of Laws and the Constitution (pts. 1-2), 55 W. VA. L. REv. 131,
233 (1953). By analogy the McCartin rule could be applied to the alternative re-
covery permitted by the "twilight zone," but the Supreme Court has never said that
the same principle applies. Courts have had difficulty in reconciling the conflict
between the alternative recovery permitted in a "twilight zone" case with the mutual
Vol. 1963: 327]
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Application of the "twilight zone" doctrine by the courts, how-
ever, yielded only confusion. Many courts employed the concept
to expand state jurisdiction beyond the limits of the "maritime but
local" doctrine,21 while a few courts recognized the federal and state
acts as concurrently operative in every instance.22  Other courts,
however, restricted the application of the "twilight zone" option and
continued to adhere to the doctrine thiat the federal and state acts
were mutually exclusive.23 In the meantime, the Supreme Court
in a series of per curiam decisions merely affirmed the expansion
of state jurisdiction without explanation of its limits. 24  Hence,
the vagueness and constitutional implications of the "maritime but
local" concept were compounded and thus continued to be the
major cause of administrative confusion in the federal-state conflict
over compensation for harbor workers.25  Perpetuation of this con-
fusion by literal application of section 3 (a) in the instant case would
have been unjustifiable.
In seeking to dispel this confusion, the Court in Calbech ex-
plicitly recognized that the jurisdiction of the Longshoremen's Act
exclusiveness of § 5 of the act. See, e.g., Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d
409 (9th Cir. 1952), 66 HARV. L. Rv. 524 (1953); Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 1205,
1215-23 (1958). See also note 31 infra.
22 See, e.g., Allisot v. Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 4 N.J. 445, 78 A.2d 153
(1950) (repair injury); Commissioner of Taxation & Fin. v. Oceanic Serv. Corp,, 276
App. Div. 725, 97 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1950) (watchman); Moores's Case, 323 Mass. 162,
80 N.E.2d 478, af'd per curiam sub nom. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874
(1948).
22 See Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 95 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958) (longshoreman injured in hold of ship allowed to recover
under Louisiana Act); Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Marshall, 808 S.W.2d 174
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (followed the Lake Charles case in allowing state jurisdiction
over a repair injury).
2 8 See, e.g., Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 920 (1959); Warner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 332 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960).
2' See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874, affirming per curiam,
Moores's Case, 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948) (repair injury); Avondale Marine
Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366, affirming per curiam, 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.
1953) (injury on marine railroad some 400 feet from the water); Hahn v. Ross Island
Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959), reversing per curiam, 214 Ore. 1, 320 P.2d
668 (1958). The picture was further confused by the uncertainty as to the meaning
of the Jensen doctrine and the Court's statements that it was severely restricted by
Davis v. Department of Labor, supra note 12. See Standard Dredging Corp. v.
Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 309 (1943) (dictum); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731,
743 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also 2 LAsoN § 89.25-A0; D. Currie, Fed-
eralism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 158, 202-19;
Note, 72 HARv. L. Rlv. 1363 (1959); Comment, 50 Nw. U.L. Rav. 677 (1955); Com-
ment, 2 STAN. L. REv. 536 (1950).
2' See Baer, supra note 12 at 450.
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and state acts are concurrent for injuries on navigable waters except
in those cases where the Jensen doctrine of maritime uniformity
made questionable the availability of a state remedy.26 In practice,
since the Court did not overrule any of its earlier decisions allowing
the expansion of state jurisdiction, the net result most probably will
be that only longshoremen injured on navigable waters while loading
and unloading cargo will not be able to seek state benefits under
the "twilight zone" doctrine.27
At the same time, the Court's rather conspicuous failure to under-
mine the pre-existing tendency of the "twilight zone" cases to extend
state jurisdiction does not seem to impair the maritime uniformity
sought by Jensen. Since state acts differ only in detail from the
Longshoremen's Act, the result under either will be the same in
most cases.28 Furthermore, in almost every instance, the benefits
under the federal act are more generous than those under the state
acts. 29 Thus, as a practical matter, the injured claimant will prob-
ably accept the uniform federal remedy even though he could
theoretically get recovery under the applicable state act.
Finally, the extension of federal jurisdiction in the Calbeck
decision will greatly simplify the administration of the Longshore-
men's Act. In order to recover, an injured employee will need to
show only that the injury occurred on navigable waters and that
the employer qualifies under section 904 (2).30 Confusion about the
20 370 U.S. at 126.
27 In its narrowest context the denial of state benefits to longshoremen injured on
navigable waters is all that the Jensen case prohibited. See Pennsylvania R.R. v.
O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 337 (1953) (dictum); Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.2d
218, overruling on rehearing en banc, 265 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1959).
28 For the provisions of the state acts, see 1 LAmSON § 56.10 and 2 LARSON 509-23
(App. A); see also Allen, That "Twilight Zone" Between the Jurisdictions of State and
Federal Compensation Acts, 16 INs. COUNSEL J. 202, 207 (1949). But see, Note, 36
TULANE L. Rev. 134, 137, n. 16.
2
' In terms of the maximum weekly benefits and the total maximum compensation,
as of October 1961, only Alaska, Arizona and Hawaii provide overall higher benefits
than the Longshoremen's Act. Some states, however, may possibly be more generous
in a particular category. Thus Oregon, although providing lower weekly benefits,
has no maximum total for temporary total disability, whereas the maximum total
for this category under the Longshoremen's Act is $24,000. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
BULL. No. 161, 10-38 (1961 Supp.). See also 2 LARSON at 524-58 (App. B). The differ-
ence can be very great. Thus in Calbeck, the awards under the Longshoremen's Act
were in one case 6.6 times higher ($83,000 to $12,600 for death bencfits-Texas law)
than the maximum possible under the applicable state act, and in the other case,
9.6 times higher ($134,784 to $14,000 for total permanent disability-Louisiana law).
Brief for Petitioners, pp. 6, 10.
30 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 902 (4) (1958), defines a qualifying employer as
Vol. 1963: 327]
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applicability of the act will be dispelled for the first time, and accord-
ingly, nearly all injured harbor workers will be assured of expe-
ditious receipt of benefits under the self-executing features of the
Longshoremen's Act 3' without the uncertainty, delay, and expense
of litigation. Although the qualifying employer will still have to
carry insurance to meet the contingency of state compensation awards
in "twilight zone" cases, double insurance on this area has long
been necessary and is a simple, inexpensive process.32 Thus, the
employer is no worse off than previously.
To accomplish these results, the Supreme Court in Calbech in-
dulged in flagrant judicial legislation. Criticism should be tem-
pered, however, with knowledge that the Court began to rewrite the
second proviso of section 3 (a) twenty years ago and with recognition
of the practical benefits inuring to the injured harbor workers.
one "any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in
part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)."
31 Under § 14 of the act the employer, or his.insurer, must begin making compensa-
tion payments within 14 days after knowledge of the injury. The injured employee
thus receives automatic voluntary payments and very few formal hearings involving
disputed claims are ever held. See Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 220, 225
(5th Cir. 1958). While Calbeck decided that the mere acceptance of voluntary benefits
under similar direct payment provisions of state acts does not preclude supplementary
recovery under the Longshoremen's Act, the Court did not deal with the troublesome
question of whether acceptance of payments under the act bars supplemental state
recovery in a "twilight zone" case. See, e.g., 2 LARSON, § 89.30-.52; Rodes, supra note
13, at 647-50. See also discussion in note 20 supra. Perhaps an equitable solution
would be to allow the claimant to recover supplemental benefits in either situation
unless (1) there has been a formal award under either the Longshoremen's Act or the
applicable state act, or (2) the injured employee has received voluntary payments under
one act for a sustained period of time without filing a claim for supplementary benefits.
Cf. Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock & Repair Yard, Inc., 305 F.2d 369, 377 (5th
Cir. 1962); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F.2d 794, modified, 279
F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1960); T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.
1960); Jones v. Baton Rouge Marine' Contractors, 127 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 1961);
Dunleavy v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks, 17 N.J. Super. 76, 85 A.2d 543 (Hudson Co.
Ct. 1951), aff'd on opinion below, 20 N.J. Super. 486, 90 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1952),
cert. denied, 10 NJ. 343, 91 A.2d 448 (1952) (injured employee received voluntary
payments under the Longshoremen's Act for six years before filing a state claim).
32Forty-four states allow self-insurance; and there is a standard workmen's com-
pensation policy used throughout the country which can be endorsed to cover, on a
pro rata basis, maritime operations under the Longshoremen's Act. See Gardner,
Remedies For Personal injuries To Seamen, Railroadmen, And Longshoremen, 71
HARv. L. Rav. 438, 450 n.34 (1958); Note, 50 CAuF. L. Rnv. 342, 347 (1962).
